HANCOCK vs. AUSTIN.

tion made by Wood was perfectly proper. It cannot be permitted to the plaintiff to object that the defendant credited the
statement of his assignor. The defendant wNas not to assume it
was untrue, and the law would have assumed that he gave credit
to the representation whether he had so testified to it or not.
But this objection is wholly imbaterial, as the defendant testified
without objection, that he entered into the contract relying upon
that representation, namely, the representation that he, Wood,
had purchased Elwood's hops. This shows beyond all controversy, that he believed the representation to be true, and his
statement that he so believed it, was of no importance. The
judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
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By an agreement between A. and B., A. agreed to pay B. 12s. a week for the
use of standing room and steam-power for certain machinery belonging to A.,
in a room the property of B.,- and to which B. had access to oil the machinery.
B., in the absence of A., who had locked his room, unfastened the window, entered, and distrained the machines for rent: Held, that trover lay for the conversion of the machines, for there was no distrainable rent issuing out of the
standing ground, and that if the whole room was demised, then the entry was
unlawful.

This was an action tried before ERLE, C. J., at the Derbyshire
Summer Assizes, 1862. The declaration contained a count in
trover, and also a count for excessive distress. The defendant
pleaded not guilty, by statute 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, § 21. The plaintiff sued as assignee of one Needham, a bankrupt, who occupied
a room in a factory belonging to the defendant, in which room
he had placed three lace machines, worked by steam-power supplied to them by an engine of the defendant's factory. "For
the standing and steam-power for the said machines," lNeedham
agreed to pay 12 s. a week. The defendant had a right to enter
this room for the purpose of oiling his machinery. Previously
to his insolvency Needham went out, leaving his door locked, and
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the window fastened with a hasp. During his absence the defendant entered the room by pushing back a pane of the window,
which was contrived to open, unfastening the hasp by the intro
duction of his arm, thus opening the window, and admitting him
self into the room: The defendant then distrained the three lace
machines for arrears of weekly rent due from Needham. The
jury found a verdict for the plaintiff generally for 1801. Leave
was reserved to the defendant to move that the damages be reduced 401., being the sum assessed for the issues not disputed, on
the ground that the exclusive possession of the .premises on
which the machines stood was not demised to the plaintijf, and
that even if it were, the entry by the window without breaking
any fastening, was lawful for the purpose of distraining. A rule
having been obtained accordingly, /
.

ferewether (Hacaulay, Q. C., with him) showed cause.-The
distress was illegal, because the relation of landlord and tenant
did not exist. There was no demise of the room, nor of any
part of it. What was granted amounted to an easement only.
Buszard vs. Capel, 8 B. & Cr. 141. Then if the relation of
landlord and tenant existed, the mode of entry was clearly unlawful. Semayne's case, 1 Smith's L. C. 85, and notes; 9 Yin.
Ab. 128, tit. "cDistress," E. 2, pl. 6; Brown vs. Glenn, 16 Q.
B. 254 ; Curtis vs. Hubbard, 1 Hill's New York Rep. 336;
Ryan vs. Shilcock, 7 Exch.-72; Attack vs. Bramwell, 32 L. J.,
Q. B. 146; 9 Jur., N. S. 892; Sandon vs. Jervis, 27 L. J., Q.
B. 279; 4 Jur., N. S. 737.
Field (Hays, Serjt., with him), in support of the rule.-There
was no demise of the exclusive possession of the room. The defendant was entitled, therefore, to enter it. There was, however,
a sufficient demise of the standing room to give a right of
distress. There was an exclusive occupation for a fixed time
conferred, similar to stallage. The Mayor of Great Yarmouth
vs. Groom, 1 H. & C. 102. The mode of entry was lawful. The
defendant had a right to go into the room to inspect his machines ;
and the window, not being part of the premises demised, was his
own. Gould vs. Bradtock, 4 Taunt. 562; Ryan vs. Shilcock,
7 Exch. 72; Tutton vs. Darkie, 5 H. & Norm. 647; 6 Jur., N.
S., 988.
ERLE, C. J.-I am of opinion that this rule must be dis-
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charged. The action was in trover for the conversion of three
lace machines, seized and sold by the defendant. The jury
found a verdict for the plaintiff 1301% leave being reserved to
the defendant to reduce the damages to 401., if the court
should be of opinion that the defendant could establish his right
to distrain. A landlord may enter his tenant's room in the ordinary way if he has a right to distrain; but if the defendant in
this case had no such right, the entry was wrongful, and he committed a trespass. It is said that the exclusive possession of the
room was not demised to the plaintiff, and that, therefore, the
landlord had a right to enter as he did, and so was not guilty of
a trespass. The question is, whether there was a distrainable
rent? If the room was not demised, then I am of opinion that
the money was due under a contract merely, and that the 128. a
week, to be paid for the easement of the standing and the power
furnished to the machines, could not be distrained for as rent.
If the room was demised, then turning the hasp of the window
was a trespass, for which the landlord is liable. The defendant
is, therefore, in a dilemma, out of which he cannot escape. I
think that the action of trover lies, and that the rule must be
discharged.
am of the same opinion. Two views have
WILLIAMS, J.-I
been presented to us. It is said on the one hand, that the whole
room was the subject of the demise, and that, therefore, the
breaking open of the window rendered the distress invalid. The
landlord's right is no doubt qualified, and this would be a breaking, within the rule; but the landlord says, that he did not
demise the whole room, but only the stipulated space for the
machines, and that he broke his own window only. Can this be
maintained? If there was no demise of the room, can it be
maintained, that there was a demise of the ground on which the
machines stood? I am of opinion that there was no such demise,
and that rent did not issue out of the very ground on which the
machines stood. There was no reversion. The machines were
not fixed, and that fortifies my position. The landlord, therefore, was a trespasser.
WILLES

and

KEATING,

JJ., concurred.

Rtule discharged.
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Where goods are insured for a voyage there is no implied warranty on the
part of the insurers that the goods are seaworthy.

Action upon a policy of insurance upon a ship's cargo of cocoanut oil in casks from Cochin to Marseilles.
Fourth plea:That the premises so insured were not seaworthy for the said
voyage at the time the said ship departed and set sail thereon.
Demurrer..-The grounds of demurrer were stated to be, that
there was no implied warranty of seaworthiness of goods insured
by a policy, and that the plea did not allege that the loss was
attributable to the condition of the goods.
Sir

a.

ifonyman appeared to support -the demurrer,, but

Watklin Williams was called on to support the plea.-It is an
implied condition of every contract of insurance that the subject
of insurance is in a proper state to encounter the risk insured
against. Goods insured ought to be in a condition to encounter
the ordinary incidents of a sea voyage without incurring damage,
supposing no accident to happen.

It is no argument against this

plea that it is new in form: Boyd vs. Dubois, 3 Campb. 133; 1
Park on Insurance 458; 3 Kent's Commentaries 360; ibson
vs. Small, 4 H. of L. Cas. 353.
WILLES, J.-I am of opinion that the defendant's fourth plea
is not a sufficient answer to the plaintiff's claim. It might be
sufficient to dispose of the case by-saying that the plea is, novel
in character and principle, and that in actions on policies of
insurance, in which questions of a similar kind are so often raised,
and in which the ingenuity of counsel suggests all kinds of claims
and answers, we should have had instances of attempts-to plead
such a plea as this, if it had been a good plea. But, besides being novel, the plea is inadmissible as seeking to create a new implied warranty in a contract of insurance. An insurer is not
liable to make good damage resulting from any peculiar vice in
the thing insured itself, and unseaworthiness is expressly provided for in the law of some countries. But it is necessary to
trace the damage for which an indemnity is sought to the unseaworthiness which is proved to have existed. With respect to
goods this is familiar law, and is stated in Smith's Merc. Law
359, where, on the authority of Boyd vs. .Dubois, it is said:-
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